

# Indian Matchmaking: Are Working Women Penalized in the Marriage Market in India?

Divya Dhar\*

University of Oxford

May 5, 2022

## Abstract

This paper shares results from an online experiment to assess whether working women face a penalty in the marriage market in India. Using a randomized controlled trial on a popular Indian matchmaking website, I find that profiles of women who signal wanting to work after marriage receive upto 22 per cent less interest from men than those of women who have never worked. Women willing to give up work after marriage face a lower penalty. In a country characterized by low female labor force participation and near-universal marriage, these findings on marital preferences may help explain the role of gender norms in shaping women's labor supply decisions in India.

**JEL codes:** J01, J12, J16, J18

---

\*Contact information: [diva.dhar@bsg.ox.ac.uk](mailto:diva.dhar@bsg.ox.ac.uk). Mrinal Tomar and Michelle Cherian provided excellent research assistance to the project. I thank the Blavatnik School of Government and CSAE for funding this research. I'm grateful for guidance from Anandi Mani, Clare Leaver, Ridhi Kashyap, Julien Labonne on this project. I thank Rohini Pande, Lotus McDougal, Germano Mwabu, Charity Moore, Jamie Walsh, Lant Pritchett, Anisha Singh, Ratna Sudarshan and BSG seminar participants for their comments. The trial is registered in the AEA RCT registry (AEARCTR-0005978).

# 1 Introduction

The productive use of human capital is an essential input enabling economic growth, while employment outside the home plays a crucial role in increasing incomes and eliminating poverty. The startlingly low labor force participation rate of women in India is therefore a significant cause for concern. In 2018, only 23 per cent of women participated in the workforce, *declining* from 43 per cent in 1993-94, even as the country has grown more developed and educated (Government of India, 2019 ).

The literature has considered several explanations for low female labor force participation. One of these is the possible role of gender norms (Jayachandran, 2020), including marital norms. Men’s preferences in the marriage market may play a significant role in constraining women from joining, staying or excelling in the work force (Burstzyn et al, 2017). Studies in the United States have shown that men prefer to date women who seem less ambitious (Fisman et al, 2006) and that marital incentives may explain why women try to appear less assertive and ambitious in the presence of male peers (Burstzyn et al, 2017). This factor may be particularly consequential in India because the country is characterized by both remarkably high marriage rates<sup>1</sup> as well as regressive attitudes towards working wives and mothers. Almost half of adult men and women report that married women whose husbands earn well should not work outside the home (Coffey et al, 2018).

Given the continuing hold of marriage in Indian society, women’s choices or decisions to work may be closely linked to potential outcomes and penalties in the marriage market. To better understand this channel, I conduct the first experiment online to determine whether working women are discriminated against in the marriage market – for having entered the labor force or wanting to continue to work after marriage. I create 5 fictitious marital profiles for women on India’s most popular matrimonial website Shaadi.com, which are identical in every way except in their statements around work and income. The only difference lies in the reporting of whether a) they currently work or not and b) whether they intend to continue working after marriage. I also vary the income of those who work (relatively high or low). In

this manner, I create profiles for 4 different caste categories and randomly assign men from these castes to receive expressions of interest from one of the same caste profiles. 2749 male suitors, registered and active on the website, and living in and around the Indian capital, receive invites from one of these fabricated profiles. In turn, their responses are captured as an indicator of marital interest and potential marriage outcomes.

I find large differences in responses and interest expressed towards women who want to pursue a career after marriage. All else equal, women who have never worked seem to elicit the most interest on average, followed by women who propose to give up work after marriage. Women who propose an interest in continuing to work after marriage receive 15-22 per cent less interest in initial acceptances, indicating lower tolerance and support for women's work after marriage. Interestingly, this is mediated somewhat by income – higher earning women who want to continue working after marriage face a lower penalty than their lower earning peers. While one might have expected higher-earning women to face greater discrimination for being more ambitious and outperforming men on income, this is in fact not the case in the experiment.

This study contributes to the literature on gender norms and women's labor force participation. This experiment can help more cleanly identify the relationship between women's labor force participation (both before and after marriage) and income with their outcomes in the marriage market. To my knowledge, this is the first experimental study that assesses the impact of women's work characteristics using the revealed preference of potential male partners.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, I explore the relevant literature this work contributes to. In Section 3, I lay out the study objectives and research questions. In Sections 4, I explain the experimental design and data collection in more detail, and Section 5 lays out the empirical analysis. Finally, I discuss the results and limitations of the study in Sections 6 and 7 respectively.

## 2 Literature

There is a growing body of descriptive evidence from India documenting the prevalence of regressive gender norms related to work for women, especially married women and mothers. For instance, the recent Social Attitudes Research, India survey conducted in various regions (Delhi, Mumbai, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh) shows that around half the adults, both men and women, report that married women whose husbands earn well should not work outside the home (Coffey et al, 2018). With the exception of the national capital region of Delhi, the approval rate for women’s work is lower than what it was in the United States 45 years ago (Coffey et al, 2018). Similarly, Dhar et al (2018) find that only 21 per cent of adolescent boys, and 27 per cent of their fathers surveyed in Haryana disagreed with the statement that a woman’s most important role is to be a good home maker. In addition, around 40 per cent of men surveyed in India believe that working women don’t have good relations with their children compared to stay at home mothers (Fletcher et al, 2018). Fletcher et al (2018) note that social norms around women’s role as domestic caregivers often mean that women are curtailed from seeking work, and that these views may in turn be internalized, suppressing their participation in the labor force.

Beyond these attitudes on gender roles, there may also be additional marital norms around a woman’s income relative to her spouse. Fisman et al (2006) find that American men exhibit a preference for dating women who are less ambitious than them. In fact, Bertrand et al (2015) find that rising female wages play a substantial role in explaining decreasing marriage rates in the United States. Further, Bertrand et al (2015) show that a higher potential income for the woman relative to her husband can lower her probability of participation in the labor force. If the woman does work, she is likely to work fewer hours, so that she earns less than her potential income. Bertrand et al (2015)’s analysis reveals that the wife’s share of household income in the United States shows a sharp drop just at the half-point mark, such that they would not outperform their husbands. For couples where the wife does earn more, Bertrand et al (2015) find lower reported satisfaction, greater discord

and a higher likelihood of divorce. The projections from their model show a substantial decline in potential matches if the woman's income exceeds the husband. In India, Kashyap et al (2015) also find evidence of gender-regressive marital norms around spousal education. They find that despite increased education for women, less than 13 per cent of marriages between 1999 and 2004 are hypogamous.

In the presence of such norms and preferences, marital incentives may shape women's decisions around work. For example, the prospect of marriage can lead women to downplay stated career goals (Bursztyn et al, 2017). In a field experiment with married and single female MBA students, they find that single women downplay their career ambitions by reporting lower desired salaries, lower willingness to work longer hours or travel frequently, when their stated preferences were visible to their peers, including male peers. A model developed by Bertrand et al (2016) for developed country contexts predicts that improved labor market opportunities for skilled women in countries with more conservative gender norms is less likely to improve their marriage prospects, compared to countries with more progressive gender norms. To put this mechanism to the test in India, my paper aims to use an online experiment to determine whether women who pursue careers and earn higher incomes than male suitors face a penalty in the marriage market in India. It is the first experiment, to my knowledge, to capture the prevalence, and extent of, discrimination against women's work in the marriage market. The experimental nature helps cleanly establish the link between women's work and marital prospects, strengthening the body of evidence on gender norms and marital incentives around women's work.

Related to this, there is also an emerging, but mixed, body of evidence showing whether attitudes and norms related to women's work can be shifted. Bursztyn et al (2019) find that men in Saudi Arabia underestimate support for women's work by other men, but a quick intervention to correct and update beliefs about social norms can help increase interest in job search service and uptake for their spouses. Dhar et al (2020) find that a school based intervention can change gender attitudes, including those towards gender roles for work, for

adolescent boys and girls. On the other hand, Dean and Jayachandran (2019) find that videos and discussions on women’s employment led by employers have no effects on family attitudes.

### **3 Study Objectives: Research Questions and Primary Outcomes**

This experimental study conducted with male suitors on Shaadi.com is designed to gauge the impact of being a working woman and to understand the effect of a woman’s relative income on marriage market outcomes, in terms of the responsiveness and interest from male candidates on an Indian matrimonial website.

More specifically, the study asks the following questions to better understand the gender norms that mediate the relationship between work and marriage in India:

1. How does a woman’s having ever worked affect male suitors’ interest and potential outcomes in the marriage market?
2. How does a woman’s intention to continue working and pursuing a career after marriage, affect her options in the marriage market?
3. As a working woman, does earning more than a male suitor affect their interest and her potential outcomes in the marriage market?

The experiment was administered on India’s most popular matrimonial website, Shaadi.com, which has reached more than 35 million users since 1996 and connected hundreds of thousands life partners (Shaadi.com, 2019), making it an ideal and convenient setting for the experiment. It was implemented with a sample of 2749 male suitors across castes/sub-castes (Brahmin, Agarwal, Rajput and Kayastha) in and around the National Capital Region of India, registered on Shaadi.com. Research ethics approval for the study was given by the

Blavatnik School of Government, Departmental Research Ethics Committee, in line with the University of Oxford procedures for human subjects research.

The main outcome this study looks at are response rates from the male suitors in the sample to the expressions of interest from fabricated female profiles, which differ only in their details on work and income. This response from male suitors can be taken as a proxy for potential marriage outcomes. Previous studies have shown that preferences captured through these experiments can be a good proxy for actual outcomes, as shown by Banerjee et al (2013) based on their analysis of preferences of those who place marriage ads in a newspaper. Based on the variation in the response rate from male suitors, the study can thus help identify if there is a penalty to being a career woman or a high-income earner in the Indian marriage market. I will use the response rates to see if there is significantly higher responsiveness and interest from male suitors for the marriage profiles of women who do not work or those who profess to leave work after marriage. Among the profiles for working women, I will look at whether responsiveness is higher for those who earn less.

## 4 Experimental Design and Setting

This study employs methods similar to those used in other experimental and correspondence studies on discrimination (Bertrand and Dufllo, 2016), such as Edelman et al (2017) and Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) who test for racial discrimination in rental markets and job hiring respectively. It applies these methods to test for discrimination in the marriage market against women's work and income. I do so by creating sets of typical marital profiles for women from different castes/sub-castes that are nearly identical in nature. The only difference lies in the reporting of whether they currently work or not, and signaling whether they intend to continue working after marriage. For those who work, I vary profiles by income (see below). All else equal, the differences in response to these different marriage profiles can then help ascertain discrimination against women's work and career choices.

## 4.1 Creating marriage profiles for women varied by work and income

First, the experimental study on Shaadi.com required a number of (fabricated) women’s profiles to be created on the website for the purpose of the study. In order to look realistic, the language in the profiles was modelled on other profiles on the website, using language and structure that would make it seem representative and typical of other women on the site. The language was further refined based on inputs from and consultations with other young users of the website.

Given that marriage preferences in India for Hindus, who form the majority of the population, are strongly linked to caste endogamy (Banerjee et al, 2013; Kaur and Palriwala, 2016), separate profiles were created for the 4 caste categories in the study - Kayastha, Agarwal, Brahmin and Rajput. Within each caste category, the profiles created were identical on all other counts/criteria, apart from those linked to work and income – the two focal determinants of this study. The surnames, which are caste indicators, were kept the same, but the first names were varied slightly. There were no photographs shared for any of the profiles to avoid any confounding factors. To the male user on the website, the photo category would show as ‘protected’ , signaling that they would not be able to see the photo at the first stage of the interaction on the website .

More specifically, the following criteria were identical across the profiles for each caste category – age (24), height (5’4”), skin complexion (fair), religion (Hindu), mother tongue (Hindi), location (Noida – close to Delhi), education (Bachelor of Arts in Advertising/Marketing), lifestyle (no smoking, no drinking and vegetarian); horoscope (none) and hobbies. Some of these choices (such as language, lifestyle) were made to impose fewer restrictions on sampling and to help ensure a broader sample of eligible men. It’s important to note that the skin complexion category was dropped by Shaadi.com in the middle of one of the experimental rounds, following a campaign on discrimination against skin color. This change occurred simultaneously across all profiles in end-June 2020, and was therefore not a confounder.

While the profiles for each caste were identical in each of the categories such as skin color, age, height, education, there were differences in their statements around work and income. The profiles were varied to specify whether they currently worked or not, how much they earned (higher income or lower income than male suitors) and whether they intended to pursue a career after marriage or preferred to spend time with family and at home. The profiles were also linked to different phone numbers and IP addresses, but these were not visible to other users of the website. Given the variations on work and income, the profiles for each of the 4 caste categories would fall in the following categories:

1. **Control** - Never worked (NW): Not working woman who does not intend to work after marriage
2. **Treatment 1 - (HIW+)** - High income, working woman pre-marriage and post-marriage - Woman working at Rs 7-10 lakhs income category, with a stated preference for continuing work after marriage
3. **Treatment 2 -(LIW+)** – Low income, working woman pre and post-marriage – Woman working at Rs 2-4 lakhs income category, with a stated preference for continuing work after marriage
4. **Treatment 3 -(HIW)** - High income, working woman pre-marriage only - Woman working at Rs 7-10 lakhs income category, with a stated preference for giving up work after marriage
5. **Treatment 4 -(LIW)** - Low income, working woman pre-marriage only (LIW) – Woman working at Rs 2-4 lakhs income category, with a stated preference for giving up work after marriage. (Note: Detailed profiles can be found in annexure 1)

Other than their description related to work and income, the profiles of women developed for each caste category were identical in all other respects. Finally, it's also important to note that the profiles on the Shaadi.com were made based on subscriptions in the basic category

– that is, they would not be differentially promoted by the website or by the website’s algorithms to potential suitors.

## 4.2 Expressions of interest to male suitors

The experiment was carried out between April 2020 and September 2020 with 2749 male suitors registered to marry on the website. The experiment was carried out in 4 consecutive rounds – one for each caste/caste-category in the following order – Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput and Kayastha.

For each caste round, a sample of approximately 700 eligible bachelors of that same caste were selected based on certain eligibility filters using information publicly available on their profiles which was culled and entered. The sampling criteria for men included that their profile should have been active in the last month, that their location should be in and around the National Capital region of India, their annual income should be between Rupees 4-7 lakhs (i.e. ranging from approx. USD 6,000-10,000) and their age should be 21 years and above (legal age of marriage for men). No other criterion related to height, education, lifestyle, mother tongue or diet was applied. However, the sampling criteria also included dropping any candidate who was explicitly not interested in the characteristics of the female profiles above – i.e. a candidate for example, who has a specific preference for a woman in another state or a woman who is taller or is non-vegetarian. Around 50 profiles or less than 2 per cent of initially screened profiles were dropped based on these criteria<sup>2</sup>.

For each caste, the first approximately 700 eligible filtered suitors (650 for Rajputs due to sample size constraints) were then randomly allocated to receive an expression of interest from one of the five group of female profiles developed, as specified above, for the purpose of the study. That is, the suitors received a standard ‘invite’ messaging expressing their interest (see detail in annexure 2) from one of the profiles belong to the control group (NW) or one of the four treatment groups (HIW+, LIW+, HIW, LIW). Overall, 2749 bachelors from the website received an expression of interest. The characteristics of the men on the

website can be seen in Table 1.

The experiment targeted a sample size of 2749 male suitors in order to be sufficiently powered to measure the changes in response rates from male suitors based on the work choices and income status of women.

### 4.3 Measuring Responses and Interest from Male Suitors

The response from each male suitor who received an invite or expression of interest from one of the fabricated female profiles is monitored over a period of 30 days. Their online response or the status of their response is categorized in the following ways by Shaadi.com – *declined invite* (where they actively decline the expression of interest to explore the connection); *accepted invite* (where they actively accept the expression of interest to connect further); *responded later* (where they have not responded or chosen to not give a specific response) and *requested photo* (where they signal they would like to first see the profile photo before giving a response one way or the other).

For this study, I use a binary variable on whether the suitors accepted the invite or not as the primary outcome to measure interest. Any additional text messages on the profile (which could only be sent by those who accepted the invite) were not used in the experiment. Moreover, there could be no further attempt following the initial response to contact the women via email or phone, since that information was hidden and not available to male suitors.

In addition to response data from male suitors, details of their socio-economic characteristics from their profiles such as their educational qualifications, domain of work, who created the account and other details was also culled from their public profiles. This data is used to check for balance across treatment arms and also better understand any observable characteristics which predict responsiveness and interest in working women.

Ultimately, the study will measure how the male response rate differs across treatment arms to see if there is discrimination based on women’s work status, career orientation and

income.

## 5 Empirical Analysis

The main analysis will be an intent-to-treat analysis. I use the following empirical specifications in this study to understand the variation in response across women’s work and income status:

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_0 + \beta_j Treat_j + \beta_2 X_i + \varepsilon_i \quad (1)$$

$Y_{ij}$  is the outcome variable measured for individual  $i$  in treatment arm  $j$ . The primary outcome here is a binary variable which captures the response or expression of interest from the male Shaadi.com user.  $Treat_j$  is a dummy variable for the treatment arms. Thus,  $\beta_j$  represents the coefficient for the responsiveness from male users to the women across treatment groups on the outcome.  $X_i$  represents the individual level controls and characteristics such as caste, education, age, location, food preferences, field of specialization, type of work and the Shaadi.com account ownership.

### 5.1 Sample description

The sample for the study across arms was created between April to July 2020 from the following castes – Agarwal, Brahmins, Rajput and Kayastha. Table 1 describes the characteristics of the 2749 male suitors on Shaadi.com who met the eligibility criteria, and were added to the sample and randomly assigned to one of the treatment groups.

Over half of the men in the sample only had an undergraduate degree, whereas less than 1 per cent had a doctorate. The most common field of study was Engineering – approximately 40 per cent of the sample had studied Engineering. Other common degrees included Arts & Sciences, Management, Finance and Commerce. A small proportion had pursued medicine, education and other fields.

Subsequently, the most common jobs and professions reported by the male candidates were engineering, IT/software, accounts and finance. The majority of men in the sample were from Delhi and the National Capital Region. As Delhi borders many states, approximately 20 per cent of the men screened were from neighboring states such as Haryana and Rajasthan.

Finally, approximately 60 per cent of these accounts were created and run by the individual themselves. Over a quarter of the accounts were created by parents, and the remaining run by others in their families. Finally, the sample is spread almost evenly across all 4 castes in the sample – Brahmin, Rajput, Agarwal and Kayastha.

While the characteristics were mostly balanced across treatment groups, there were certain significant differences for a few characteristics in one arm or two arms. For example, the number of male suitors with an undergraduate degree alone was significantly higher at 56.3% in the LIW arm (compared to 50.7% in the NW arm). However, these differences were spread across groups and were not concentrated in any one treatment group. Regardless, these traits may influence final outcomes and are thus controlled for in the analysis following Bruhn and Mackenzie (2009) to ensure the robustness of the analysis.

## **5.2 Does women’s work affect marital interest from men?**

### **5.2.1 Average responses**

Table 2 and Figure 1 show the mean acceptance rates across all arms, capturing the differences in male suitors’ response to women’s intention to work and their relative income from their marital profiles. The first row in Table 2 shows that mean acceptance rates are highest for the women who have never worked, i.e. the NW arm, at 69.8 per cent. Next, the acceptance rates seem to hover over 66 per cent for those who worked before marriage but state their interest in discontinuing work after marriage - the HIW and LIW arms. The differences between the means of these groups and the NW arms are not statistically significant. However, there is a sharp drop in response for women who want to continue working after marriage. Their acceptance rates are at 59.6 and 54.7 per cent for the high income

(HIW+) and low income (LIW+) groups respectively. This represents a difference in overall response rates of 10 to 15 percentage points from the NW group, which can be attributed simply to women’s intentions to work after marriage. There is, however, significant variation in mean response rates across castes, as captured in Figure 2.

How strong is the penalty in the marriage market for a woman if she intends to pursue her career after marrying? These average response rates imply that women who have never worked receive 15-22 per cent more interest in the marriage market compared to women who want to keep working. For every 100 men who respond to a woman who has never worked, only 78-85 men will respond to a woman who wants to keep working. Similarly, if a woman is working but plans to give up work, she will actually have 11-20 per cent more interest in initial response rates than if she expressed a desire to keep on working after marriage. A woman who has never worked is thus more likely to have more options in the marriage market – and a woman who wants to work, but earns less than the man, is likely to receive less interest.

### 5.2.2 Regression analysis

I conduct regression analyses using linear and logit models both with and without controls to determine the treatment effects. Table 3, Columns 1-4 report on the regressions where the primary outcome is men’s responsiveness and interest for the marital profiles, using both linear and logit models. The regressions in columns 1 and 2 include additional control variables to account for other characteristics of the male suitors in different groups and caste differences

I find that, all else equal, *men are demonstrably less interested in women who want to work after marriage*. These results in Rows 1 and 2 are robust across specifications, with and without controls. There is also suggestive evidence of a minor penalty for those who worked before marriage but do not plan to continue working. The coefficients are small and negative as seen in Rows 3 and 4.

The linear specification in Column 1 shows that men were 10 percentage points less likely to respond to women who earn more than them and want to work after marriage (HIW+ group). They were 15 percentage points less likely to respond to women who want to continue work but earn less than them (LIW+ group). This difference is robust across specifications – this translates into 15-22 per cent less interest from men. The logit model in Column 2 also show odds ratios of 0.55 and 0.43 respectively for the HIW+ and LIW+ groups, signaling that women in these groups have lower odds of receiving responses from men. Across specifications, the results consistently show that there is sizeable, significant negative interest from men in both arms where women want to *work after marriage*. These results are robust and significant to more expansive definitions of interest and responsiveness from male suitors. As Table 8 shows, these results hold even when I broaden the definition of interest from 'accepting invite' to those who also 'requested a photo'.

In comparison, the effect sizes of having worked before marriage on interest from male suitors are smaller. Column 1 does show that men were 3 and 4 percentage points less likely to send a response for the HIW and LIW groups respectively, than to women who had never worked (NW). However, the results for the HIW group are not significant and those for the LIW group are not consistently significant. These results are also not significant when the definition of interest is expanded to include photo requests, as seen in Table 8. We thus see a slight, but not consistently significant, reduction in interest in women who have done work before marriage, compared to those who did not work at all.

### **5.3 Does women's relative income affect marital interest?**

The next set of analyses look at whether the primary outcome of men's expression of interest in marriage changes based on the relative income of the women.

Testing specifically for differences to response to women who earn more or less than the men, I find that income makes a significant difference *only* for the women who want to work after marriage. Column 5 of Table 3 indicates that the t-test statistic is significant for the

difference between HIW+ and LIW+ group mean, whereas the t-test is not significant for differences between the HIW and LIW groups. This means that the amount of income matters for men’s choices only when women want to continue working after marriage. Contrary to initial expectations given regressive attitudes around higher incomes for women, it seems that men are slightly more (not less) interested in women who earn more than them, showing that the norm against women earning relatively more does not seem to hold sway.

This result seems to show that while there is a clear preference for women not working after marriage, there does not seem to be an additive preference or norm around women earning more than their husbands. In fact, men seem to be willing to give up some of their unease around women’s work should they earn more after marriage. There may be further explanations for why this is the case which I discuss in Section 5.6.

## 5.4 Heterogeneity analysis

### 5.4.1 Caste heterogeneity

Table 4 examines the differences in responses to women’s work across the four castes in the study. By running separate linear and logit models with controls for each caste group, it is clear that there are important differences across castes. The penalty towards women who want to work after marriage for both high and low income earners is strongest among Agarwal and Brahmin castes – both of which are higher on the caste hierarchy.

In contrast, these results do not seem to hold consistently for the castes of Rajputs and Kayasthas, who are deemed to be comparatively lower on the caste hierarchy. For Rajputs, the coefficients are negligible and not statistically significant. For Kayasthas, the coefficients are negative but are not consistently significant.

Is the penalty for women’s work after marriage more pressing in higher castes matter? While this study encompasses a limited number of castes, these results suggest that this may be the case. These estimates echo findings from previous research which indicates that norms restricting women’s work are more rigid for upper caste women in India (Field et al,

2010), whereas lower caste women are subject to lower restrictions on their work. These rigid norms derive from Hindu concepts around ‘purity’ and ‘pollution’, where higher caste women’s status and honor are shielded by keeping them away from encountering men outside their family alone (Jayachandran 2020, Chen 1995).

#### **5.4.2 Heterogeneity by men’s education**

Table 5 reports the differences in responses to women’s work based on the male candidate’s education. The ‘higher education’ dummy identifies those who have a postgraduate Masters or doctoral degree, and is interacted with treatment in the regression. There does not seem to be any concrete evidence of differential discrimination from those men with higher education, given that all of the interaction terms are small and not significant. Higher education does not seem to change preferences related to women’s work after marriage.

### **5.5 What type of men are interested in women who work?**

The probit regression shown in Table 6 analyzes if there are any observable differences associated with men who are more likely to be accepting of women who work after marriage. The only observable differences are that men who are more likely to accept working spouses tend to be slightly younger, and are more likely to have an account created by themselves, rather than by their families. Their education, work sector or specialization is not predictive of the progressiveness of their attitudes related to women’s work.

### **5.6 What explains these preferences – gender norms, income or human capital channels?**

There may be a few potential mechanisms at play driving the differences in responses and reactions from grooms and their families to women’s work and income. I lay out three main channels here, and use the results, to disentangle the prevalence of these channels, as laid out in the published pre-analysis plan for this paper.

The first channel is the *Income* channel. In keeping with standard economic theory, there may be a preference for women who work and earn, and those who earn more, as they increase the household income. However, on the other hand, men may not prefer women who work or earn more than them because they would face sanctions or social costs within their families and communities with regressive gender norms. Restrictive gender norms around women's work may lower their preferences on women who have worked or earned more, specifically those who are planning to work after marriage, since they would not be willing to meet prevalent social norms. This would thus constitute the *Gender Norms* channel. Lastly, a woman's work and higher income may be a signal of *human capital development*, which may be valued for the improved ability to contribute to her children's future human capital development (Afridi et al, 2016), like schooling (Behrman et al, 1999) All three channels could have been driving preferences, but the randomization and differences across treatment arms allow us to disentangle the effects of these channels.

To start with, I look at the *gender norms channel*. First, since men are visibly a lot less interested in the profiles of women who want to pursue careers after marriage, it's clear that gender norms and social expectations around wives not working and staying at home is a powerful driver of marriage preferences. Since human capital accumulation signalling at the time of the match is the same for women who have worked and are willing to give it up (HIW and LIW) compared to those who are pursuing a career (HIW+ and LIW+), the differences in interest across those groups illustrate the sway of social and gender norms on working after marriage. The gender norms channel alone explains this sizeable difference in interest between the two groups, underlining the importance of social and gender norms in driving decisions around marriage and women's work. However, the *gender norms channel* does not extend to penalizing women who have at least worked before marriage to the same extent, as long as they signal the desire to leave work and conform to more traditional gender roles after marriage.

However, there is some evidence that the *income channel* also contributes to marriage

preferences. Within the group of women who want to work after marriage, there is a marginally higher preference for women who earn more, showing that the *income channel* has some effect. While still quite weak, the *income channel* can chip away at and counter some of the negative response arising from the *gender norms channel*. Weighed against the prospect of greater income and benefits, men seem to more be willing to give up their qualms around women's work. However, the benefits from additional income do not seem to be strong enough to overcome the social costs of going against prevalent gender norms. It's also important to note that the *income channel* cannot account for the responses towards higher and lower income women (HIW and LIW) who do not want to continue working after marriage, since their income generation would end with marriage.

Finally, the *human capital channel* hypothesis does not seem to pan out. We see this in two different ways. First, men do not show a concretely higher demand for women who have work experience (HIW and LIW) over those who do not (NW), even if both sets of women meet prevalent gender norms by staying at home after marriage. Second, men do not seem to be significantly more interested in women who earned relatively more *before* marriage (HIW), compared to those who earn less (LIW). The ability to earn relatively more is as a proxy for greater human capital accumulation, but men seem indifferent between these two groups. This is not the case, however, for those who earn more after marriage, but that difference can be attributed to the *income channel*. Thus, male suitors do not seem to place a value on work experience and income generation as a contributor for human capital development for future offspring.

To summarize, men's lower rate of responsiveness to women who want to work after marriage can be explained by the dominance of the *gender norms* channel. This channel, can be somewhat mitigated or countered, by the *income channel*, which explains why women who earn more (HIW+) elicit more interest than their lower income counterparts (LIW+). Lastly, the *human capital* channel does not explain marital demand.

## 6 Limitations

This study has a number of limitations. The first weakness of this study is that the outcome of interest relies on a crude measure, since it is only looking at online responses to expressions of interest. This measure of interest does not ultimately capture whether male suitors proceed to marry a working woman or not. While this measure is a good proxy for marital interest, the study is ultimately not able to capture the final outcomes of marriage rates.

Another limitation of this study is that it relies on only one channel where people seek for marriage matches – online sites – whereas there are many other avenues to find marital matches such as social networks, newspapers, or even love at first sight! This is a common limitation for online and correspondence experiments. Moreover, given the use of this website, these results may also only be representative of more urban, wealthier, educated Indians who have access to the internet and use matrimonial sites. Finally, given the sample of suitors were chosen from in and around the national capital region, and belong to a certain wealth bracket and castes, it is not certain that these results would extend to other groups.

One more note of caution is that the experiment was conducted during the COVID pandemic. Given the nature of the randomized trial, the assumption is that unobserved effects from the pandemic would affect all groups equally in their marriage preferences. However, while it does not affect internal validity of the experiment, it is possible to argue that these preferences even for a long-term partner, in a time of crisis, may not be representative of a post-pandemic world. It was not possible to delay the experiment, but the results do largely coincide with results from a pilot/test case held with around 100 suitors from the website before the onset of the pandemic.

## 7 Conclusion

This paper examines whether women’s choices around work and career lead to discrimination in the marriage market for different castes. This study aims to use an online experiment to

assess the prevalence, and extent, of discrimination against working and career women in the marriage market in India. This could in turn help explain whether marital and gender norms pose a deterrent to why women do not join, stay or excel in the labor market.

I find that there is indeed a sizeable penalty in the marriage market for women who express an interest in pursuing a career after work. Women who want to continue pursuing work get considerably lower marital interest from male suitors. This effect is specifically predominant in the relatively higher castes among the castes selected in the study sample, given more conservative gender beliefs held and enforced by higher castes.

I find that these differences in expressions of marital interest are driven largely by preferences related to conservative norms around marriage and women's work. While the prospect of greater or additional income may help weaken these marital preferences somewhat, they do not seem to be able to overturn them. Men and their families are willing to leave money on the table, in order to conform to societal expectations on gender roles.

As the literature review indicates, marital norms and incentives related to women's work in the marriage market may also potentially influence women's decision and choices around workforce participation. Given the strength of the institution of marriage in India, this sizeable penalty in the marriage market could in turn be an important deterrent for women from continuing work and building careers. This is an area which requires further investigation in the future. Future research efforts on behavior and norm change should also focus on changing specific norms around marriage and gender roles.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup>Indeed, while marriage rates have been declining in most industrialized countries, including East Asia, marriage is near universal in India and there is no significant gap between skilled and unskilled women (Kashyap et al, 2015). By the age of 45-49, only 1 per cent of women and 2 per cent of men have never been married (International Institute of Population Sciences, 2017).

<sup>2</sup>The following number of profiles were dropped for each caste group: Agarwal- 16, Brahmin- 12, Rajput-9, Kayastha-13.


## References

- [1] Annual report 2019-20. Technical report, Government of INDIA, New Delhi, 2019.
- [2] Ahad Hassan Afridi. Human Capital and Economic Growth of Pakistan. *Business & Economic Review*, 8(1):77–86, April 2016.
- [3] Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Maitreesh Ghatak, and Jeanne Lafortune. Marry for what? caste and mate selection in modern india. *American Economic Journal: Microeconomics*, 5(2):33–72, May 2013.
- [4] Jere R. Behrman, Andrew D. Foster, Mark R. Rosenzweig, and Prem Vashishtha. Women’s schooling, home teaching, and economic growth. *Journal of Political Economy*, 107(4):682–714, 1999.
- [5] Marianne Bertrand and Esther Duflo. Field experiments on discrimination. Working Paper 22014, National Bureau of Economic Research, February 2016.
- [6] Marianne Bertrand, Emir Kamenica, and Jessica Pan. Gender Identity and Relative Income within Households. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 130(2):571–614, January 2015.
- [7] Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan. Are emily and greg more employable than lakisha and jamal? a field experiment on labor market discrimination. *American Economic Review*, 94(4):991–1013, September 2004.
- [8] Leonardo Bursztyn, Thomas Fujiwara, and Amanda Pallais. ‘acting wife’: Marriage market incentives and labor market investments. *American Economic Review*, 107(11):3288–3319, November 2017.
- [9] Martha Chen. Ties that Bind: Single Women and Family Structures. Background paper, human development report 1995, United Nations Development Programme, 1995.

- [10] D. Coffey, Payal Hathi, Nidhi Khurana, and Amit Thorat. Explicit prejudice: Evidence from a new survey. *Economic and Political Weekly*, 53:46–54, January 2018.
- [11] Benjamin Edelman, Michael Luca, and Dan Svirsky. Racial discrimination in the sharing economy: Evidence from a field experiment. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 9(2):1–22, April 2017.
- [12] Erica Field, Seema Jayachandran, and Rohini Pande. Do traditional institutions constrain female entrepreneurship? a field experiment on business training in india. *The American Economic Review*, 100(2):125–129, 2010.
- [13] Raymond Fisman, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson. Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence From a Speed Dating Experiment. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 121(2):673–697, May 2006.
- [14] International Institute for Population Sciences. India National Family Health Survey (NFHS-3), 2015-16. Technical report, IIPS, 2017.
- [15] Seema Jayachandran. Social norms as a barrier to women’s employment in developing countries. Working Paper 27449, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2020.
- [16] Ridhi Kashyap, Albert Esteve, and Joan García-Román. Potential (mis)match? marriage markets amidst sociodemographic change in india, 2005-2050. *Demography*, 52(1):183–208, 2015.
- [17] Ravinder Kaur and Rajni Palriwala. *Marrying in South Asia: shifting concepts, changing practices in a globalising world*. Orient BlackSwan, 1 edition, 2018.
- [18] Rohini Pande, Charity Troyer Moore, and Erin K Fletcher. Women and Work in India: Descriptive Evidence and a Review of Potential Policies. CID Working Papers 339, Center for International Development at Harvard University, December 2017.

# Figures

Figure 1: Mean response across treatments



# Tables

Table 1: Balance table for randomisation across all treatments

<b>Variable</b>	<b>NW</b> Mean(SE)	<b>HIW+</b> Mean(SE)	<b>LIW+</b> Mean(SE)	<b>HIW</b> Mean(SE)	<b>LIW</b> Mean(SE)
Sample size	550	550	550	548	551
Age	28.468 (0.095)	28.375 (0.099)	28.546 (0.097)	28.630 (0.096)	28.588 (0.099)
<b>Panel A- Edu Qualifications (%)</b>					
Undergraduate	50.7 (0.022)	55.3 (0.022)	50.7 (0.022)	52.4 (0.022)	56.3* (0.022)
Postgraduate	44.4 (0.022)	39.5 (0.021)	43.0 (0.021)	41.4 (0.022)	37.3** (0.021)
Doctorate	0.9 (0.004)	0.8 (0.004)	0.6 (0.003)	0.8 (0.004)	0.2 (0.002)
Diploma & Other	4.0 (0.008)	4.4 (0.009)	5.8 (0.010)	5.4 (0.010)	6.2 (0.011)
<b>Panel B- Subject Field (%)</b>					
Engineering, CS & IT	36.4 (0.021)	43.1** (0.022)	39 (0.021)	40.4 (0.022)	41.2 (0.022)
Commerce	11.0 (0.014)	7.3** (0.011)	11.3 (0.014)	9.4 (0.013)	9.1 (0.013)
Management	13.8 (0.015)	14.9 (0.016)	10.7 (0.013)	14.4 (0.015)	9.6** (0.013)
Finance	14.0 (0.015)	12.0 (0.014)	11.6 (0.014)	11.9 (0.014)	11.4 (0.014)
Arts & Sciences	15.9 (0.016)	14.9 (0.016)	18.0 (0.017)	14.4 (0.015)	20.0* (0.018)
Medicine, Education & Other	8.9 (0.012)	7.9 (0.012)	9.4 (0.013)	9.4 (0.013)	8.7 (0.012)
<b>Panel C- Job (%)</b>					
Accounts & Finance	12.2 (0.014)	14.8 (0.015)	15.6 (0.016)	16.4* (0.016)	10.4 (0.013)
Business & Entrepreneurship	7.3 (0.011)	5.1 (0.010)	5.4 (0.010)	5.8 (0.010)	7.8 (0.012)
Teaching & Training	4.5 (0.009)	2.3** (0.006)	4.9 (0.009)	2.6* (0.007)	3.0 (0.007)
Engineering	11.7 (0.014)	17.4*** (0.016)	12.0 (0.014)	12.6 (0.014)	13.2 (0.015)
IT/Software	12.4 (0.014)	12.4 (0.014)	14.4 (0.015)	15.7 (0.016)	10.6 (0.013)
Marketing	5.6 (0.010)	5.1 (0.010)	4.7 (0.009)	4.0 (0.008)	6.7 (0.011)
Sales	2.8 (0.007)	3.6 (0.008)	3.4 (0.008)	1.7 (0.006)	3.4 (0.008)
Manager/Director	6.0 (0.010)	6.0 (0.010)	6.8 (0.011)	7.7 (0.012)	7.3 (0.011)

Continued on next page

Table 1: – continued from previous page

<b>Variable</b>	<b>NW</b> Mean(SE)	<b>HIW+</b> Mean(SE)	<b>LIW+</b> Mean(SE)	<b>HIW</b> Mean(SE)	<b>LIW</b> Mean(SE)
Other	0.373 (0.021)	33.4 (0.020)	32.8 (0.020)	33.4 (0.021)	37.5 (0.021)
<b>Panel D- Location (%)</b>					
Delhi	45.6 (0.021)	49.3 (0.021)	47.5 (0.021)	43.9 (0.021)	50.6* (0.021)
NCR	35.0 (0.020)	32.2 (0.020)	32.5 (0.020)	38.1 (0.021)	31.1 (0.020)
Neighbouring States	19.3 (0.017)	18.5 (0.017)	20.0 (0.017)	18.0 (0.016)	18.2 (0.016)
<b>Panel E- Account created by (%)</b>					
Parent	25.3 (0.019)	30.2* (0.020)	29.0 (0.019)	25.4 (0.019)	24.3 (0.018)
Self	61.4 (0.021)	57.3 (0.021)	57.9 (0.021)	59.9 (0.021)	58.6 (0.021)
Other	13.3 (0.015)	12.5 (0.014)	13.1 (0.014)	14.8 (0.015)	17.1* (0.016)
<b>Panel F- Caste (%)</b>					
Agarwal	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.4 (0.019)
Brahmin	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.3 (0.019)	25.6 (0.019)
Rajput	23.6 (0.018)	23.6 (0.018)	23.6 (0.018)	23.7 (0.018)	23.6 (0.018)
Kayastha	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.5 (0.019)	25.4 (0.019)
Vegetarians (%)	56.7 (0.021)	52.0 (0.021)	54.9 (0.021)	55.4 (0.021)	54.4 (0.021)

*Notes:* \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significant difference from the NW control group mean at the 1, 5, and 10 per cent critical level.

Table 2: Frequency table for accepted invites across treatments

<b>Final Response</b>	<b>NW</b>	<b>HIW+</b>	<b>LIW+</b>	<b>HIW</b>	<b>LIW</b>
Accepted invite (SE)	69.81 (0.019)	59.63 (0.020)	54.72 (0.021)	66.78 (0.020)	66.24 (0.020)
Did not accept invite	30.19	40.37	45.28	33.16	33.76
Mean	0.698	0.596	0.574	0.667	0.662
Ratio to NW	-	0.85	0.78	0.95	0.94
Difference with NW	-	0.102***	0.151***	0.030	0.036

*Notes:* All figures are in percentages and sorted column-wise. Ratios are reported for each group's acceptance rate to control group's acceptance rate.

Table 3: Regression Analysis

Variable	Linear Model 1	Logit Model 2	Linear Model 3	Logit Model 4	T-test 5
	Co-efficients (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Co-efficients (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Difference (SE)
HIW+	-0.102*** (0.026)	0.55*** (0.08)	-0.101*** (0.028)	0.63*** (0.08)	
LIW+	-0.150*** (0.027)	0.43*** (0.06)	-0.150*** (0.028)	0.52*** (0.06)	0.049** (0.029)
HIW	-0.035 (0.025)	0.81 (0.11)	-0.030 (0.028)	0.86 (0.11)	
LIW	-0.042* (0.024)	0.77* (0.11)	-0.035 (0.028)	0.84 (0.10)	0.005 (0.028)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	No	No	
Control Mean	69.81		69.81		

*Notes:* Final responses against all treatment groups. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Regressions which control for covariates include the following characteristics- education qualifications (undergraduate/masters/PhD/other), city of residence (Delhi/NCR/neighbouring states), account created by (parent/self/other), subject field of educational qualifications (engineering, CS & IT/commerce/management/finance/arts & sciences/other), job (accounts & finance/business & entrepreneurship/teaching & training/engineer/IT & software/sales/marketing/manager & director/other), and caste (Agarwal/Rajput/Kayastha/Brahmin). T-test for significance of means between TG 1 & TG 2, and TG 3 & TG 4.

Table 4: Heterogeneity in response by education


Variables	Co-efficients (SE)
HIW+	-0.111 (0.034)**
LIW+	-0.156 (0.037)***
HIW	-0.052 (0.033)
LIW	-0.052 (0.031)
NW*Higher education	-0.009 (0.036)
HIW+ *Higher education	0.010 (0.041)
LIW+ *Higher education	0.004 (0.043)
HIW*Higher education	0.029 (0.038)
LIW*Higher education	0.011 (0.037)
Covariates	Yes

*Notes:* Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Regressions which control for covariates include the following characteristics- education qualifications (undergraduate/masters/PhD/other), city of residence (Delhi/NCR/neighbouring states), account created by (parent/self/other), subject field of educational qualifications (engineering, CS & IT/commerce/management/finance/arts & sciences/other), and job (accounts & finance/business & entrepreneurship/teaching & training/engineer/IT & software/sales/marketing/manager & director/other), and caste.

# Annexures

## Annexure 1- Additional Tables and Figures

Figure 2: Mean response by caste (for all treatments)



Graphs by Community

Table 5: Caste wise analysis of final responses against treatments.

Variable	Agarwal		Brahmin		Rajput		Kayastha	
	Linear Model 1	Odds Ratio 2	Linear Model 3	Odds Ratio 4	Linear Model 5	Odds Ratio 6	Linear Model 7	Odds Ratio 8
HIW+	-0.189*** (0.046)	0.185*** (0.083)	-0.123** (0.041)	0.287** (0.126)	0.011 (0.066)	1.048 (0.294)	-0.102 (0.062)	0.643* (0.171)
LIW+	-0.430*** (0.084)	0.061*** (0.025)	-0.096* (0.039)	0.347* (0.156)	-0.027 (0.065)	0.882 (0.243)	-0.053 (0.062)	0.799 (0.206)
HIW	-0.029 (0.035)	0.686 (0.343)	-0.028 (0.033)	0.641 (0.305)	-0.011 (0.065)	0.948 (0.266)	-0.074 (0.064)	0.730 (0.195)
LIW	0.002 (0.030)	1.219 (0.696)	-0.031 (0.034)	0.620 (0.294)	-0.099 (0.064)	0.639 (0.183)	-0.052 (0.063)	0.805 (0.210)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

*Note:* Robust SE are reported in parentheses. Odds Ratios for logit regressions are shown. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level.

Table 6: Probit analysis

Variable	Coefficient (SE)
Higher income	0.128 (0.084)
Age	-0.042 (0.019)**
Vegetarian	0.109 (0.093)
Account created by self	0.178 (0.096)*
Account created by other	-0.087 (0.137)
Postgraduate (Masters & PhD)	0.027 (0.096)
Other	0.318 (0.208)
Commerce	-0.306 (0.186)
Management	-0.118 (0.162)
Finance	0.191 (0.171)
Arts/sciences	0.103 (0.144)
Other	-0.048 (0.181)
NCR	0.066 (0.099)
Neighbouring states	0.014 (0.148)
Business & Entrepreneurship	0.040 (0.228)
Teaching & Training	-0.362 (0.256)
Engineer& IT	-0.011 (0.195)
Software	0.147 (0.197)
Sales	-0.039 (0.222)
Marketing	0.511 (0.261)
Manager/Director	-0.052 (0.212)
Other	-0.028 (0.145)
Constant	1.272 (0.572)*

*Notes:* Probit Analysis on responses record from male suitors who respond to/accept the invites from the *post-marriage working* treatment arms (both *high* and *low* income). \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. All regressions control for characteristics of male suitors.

Table 7: Overall responses from within and outside the sample

	NW	HIW+	LIW+	HIW	LIW
<b>In Sample</b>					
Declined invite	25	55	57	26	26
Accepted invite	384	328	301	366	365
Requested photo	12	3	12	15	16
Respond later	136	166	181	148	151
<b>Out of Sample</b>					
Requested photo	3	0	1	2	3
Invites	11	6	4	9	11
<i>N</i>	571	558	556	567	572

*Note:* Frequency table for final responses across treatments, including male profiles outside the sample. All figures are sorted column-wise.

Table 8: Regression Analysis (Response=1 if Invite accepted or Photo requested)

Variable	Linear Model 1	Logit Model 2	Linear Model 3	Logit Model 4	T-test 5
	Co-efficients (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Co-efficients (SE)	Odds Ratio (SE)	Difference (SE)
HIW+	-0.106*** (0.026)	0.54*** (0.08)	-0.109*** (0.028)	0.61*** (0.07)	
LIW+	-0.137*** (0.027)	0.46*** (0.07)	-0.140*** (0.028)	0.54*** (0.06)	0.030 (0.029)
HIW	-0.025 (0.025)	0.85 (0.12)	-0.024 (0.027)	0.88 (0.11)	
LIW	-0.033 (0.024)	0.81 (0.11)	-0.028 (0.027)	0.87 (0.11)	0.003 (0.028)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	No	No	

*Notes:* Final responses against all treatment groups. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent critical level. Regressions which control for covariates include the following characteristics- education qualifications (undergraduate/masters/PhD/other), city of residence (Delhi/NCR/neighbouring states), account created by (parent/self/other), subject field of educational qualifications (engineering, CS & IT/commerce/management/finance/arts & sciences/other), job (accounts & finance/business & entrepreneurship/teaching & training/engineer/IT & software/sales/marketing/manager & director/other), and caste (Agarwal/Rajput/Kayastha/Brahmin). T-test for significance of means between TG 1 & TG 2, and TG 3 & TG 4.

## Annexure 2

Figure 3: Treatment Profiles

Qualities	Control Group	Treatment Group 1	Treatment Group 2	Treatment Group 3	Treatment Group 4
<b>Name</b>	Leena Agarwal Leena Pandey Leena Thakur Leena Srivastava	Meena Agarwal Meena Pandey Meena Thakur Meena Srivastava	Neena Agarwal Neena Pandey Neena Thakur Neena Srivastava	Reena Agarwal Reena Pandey Reena Thakur Reena Srivastava	Seema Agarwal Seema Pandey Seema Thakur Seema Srivastava
<b>City</b>	Delhi	Noida	Noida	Noida	Noida
<b>City of Family</b>	Delhi	Delhi	Delhi	Delhi	Delhi
<b>Marital Status</b>	Never married	Never married	Never married	Never married	Never married
<b>Diet</b>	vegetarian	vegetarian	vegetarian	vegetarian	vegetarian
<b>Height</b>	5'4"	5'4"	5'4"	5'4"	5'4"
<b>Community</b>	Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput, Kayastha	Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput, Kayastha	Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput, Kayastha	Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput, Kayastha	Agarwal, Brahmin, Rajput, Kayastha
<b>Education level</b>	Bachelor in advertising/marketing	Bachelor in advertising/marketing	Bachelor in advertising/marketing	Bachelor in advertising/marketing	Bachelor in advertising/marketing
<b>Income</b>	N/A	Rs 7-10 lakhs	Rs 2-4 lakhs	Rs 7-10 lakhs	Rs 2-4 lakhs
<b>College name</b>	IP University	IP University	IP University	IP University	IP University
<b>You work with</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>As</b>	Does not work	Media professional	Media professional	Media professional	Media Professional
<b>Company name</b>	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
<b>About yourself</b>	I am a girl with homely values and tastes from a respectable family. I would describe myself as well-mannered, smart and cheerful. I hold a Bachelors in Marketing from IP University, but I do not work. I enjoy spending time at home and watching movies. After marriage, I would like to focus on family and home-building only. I am looking for a supportive and understanding partner. I think that should suffice for a bio, we can discuss more if you choose to contact me. Please contact if you think we'll be a match.	I am a career-oriented, ambitious girl from a respectable family. I would describe myself as well-mannered, smart and cheerful. I hold a Bachelors in Marketing from IP University, and I work as a consultant at an advertising firm. I enjoy spending time at home and watching movies. After marriage, I would like to focus on career building and family. I am looking for a supportive and understanding partner. I think that should suffice for a bio, we can discuss more if you choose to contact me. Please contact if you think we'll be a match.	I am a career-oriented, ambitious girl from a respectable family. I would describe myself as well-mannered, smart and cheerful. I hold a Bachelors in Marketing from IP University, and I work as a consultant at an advertising firm. I enjoy spending time at home and watching movies. After marriage, I would like to focus on career building and family. I am looking for a supportive and understanding partner. I think that should suffice for a bio, we can discuss more if you choose to contact me. Please contact if you think we'll be a match.	I am a girl with homely values and tastes from a respectable family. I would describe myself as well-mannered, smart and cheerful. I hold a Bachelors in Marketing from IP University, and I work as a consultant at an advertising firm. I enjoy spending time at home and watching movies. After marriage, I would like to focus on family and home-building only. I am looking for a supportive and understanding partner. I think that should suffice for a bio, we can discuss more if you choose to contact me. Please contact if you think we'll be a match.	I am a girl with homely values and tastes from a respectable family. I would describe myself as well-mannered, smart and cheerful. I hold a Bachelors in Marketing from IP University, and I work as a consultant at an advertising firm. I enjoy spending time at home and watching movies. After marriage, I would like to focus on family and home-building only. I am looking for a supportive and understanding partner. I think that should suffice for a bio, we can discuss more if you choose to contact me. Please contact if you think we'll be a match.
<b>Mother Tongue</b>	Hindi	Hindi	Hindi	Hindi	Hindi
<b>Profile created</b>	Self	Self	Self	Self	Self
<b>Age</b>	24	24	24	24	24
<b>Religion</b>	Hindu	Hindu	Hindu	Hindu	Hindu
<b>Family details</b>	Father- employed; Mother-Homemaker; 1 brother (unmarried)	Father- employed; Mother-Homemaker; 1 brother (unmarried)	Father- employed; Mother-Homemaker; 1 brother (unmarried)	Father- employed; Mother-Homemaker; 1 brother (unmarried)	Father- employed; Mother-Homemaker; 1 brother (unmarried)
<b>Skin colour</b>	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair	Fair
<b>Horoscope</b>	Non Manglik/does not matter	Non Manglik/does not matter	Non Manglik/does not matter	Non Manglik/does not matter	Non Manglik/does not matter
<b>Body Type</b>	Average/Athletic	Average/Athletic	Average/Athletic	Average/Athletic	Average/Athletic
<b>Smoke</b>	Does not smoke	Does not smoke	Does not smoke	Does not smoke	Does not smoke
<b>Drink</b>	Does not drink	Does not drink	Does not drink	Does not drink	Does not drink

## Annexure 3

Invites received by the male suitors would appear as follows:

- Invite message on Shaadi.com

“\_\_\_\_\_ wants to connect with you on Shaadi.com. Respond now to chat with him.”

“Hi, I came across your profile on Shaadi.com. If you would like to connect please accept my request.”